Tell Our Representatives That the Signal Chatters Should be Fired

On March 24, 2025, the Atlantic Magazine posted a story about how its Editor-in-Chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, was accidentally added to a group chat involving 17 high-ranking United States defense, national security, and other officials on the Signal messaging app. During the chat, they discussed then-upcoming U.S. airstrikes on Houthi bases in Yemen. The Houthis, an Iran-backed faction in the Yemeni civil war, has been attacking international shipping in the Red Sea. The goal of the U.S. strikes was to restore the security of international shipping lanes there.

The Atlantic Magazine has since posted the message chain online and it shows that the participants on the chat received very detailed information about the then-forthcoming air strikes a couple of hours before they occurred. The discussion covered the timing of the strikes and the munitions and aircraft that were to be involved. 

The chat was marred by two substantial security breaches. First, the Atlantic reporter was added to the chat in error. No other participant noticed. At first the reporter thought the chat was some sort of trick intended to discredit him in some way. When he realized it was genuine, he hung up. No other participant had questioned his presence or cut off his access. Apparently no one noticed when he left the chat, and no one ever followed up to determine who he was and what he had heard. 

The second serious breach of security was the use of the Signal app for a chat involving highly confidential and likely classified information. The Signal app utilizes some security protections, but it is subject to hacking, and therefore, government officials are prohibited from using it for discussion of sensitive information. One of the participants was at the time of the chat in Russia, which is known to have the capacity to hack into Signal communications. Officials in Russia almost certainly had advance warning of the U.S. airstrikes to come. Senator Mark Kelly, a combat veteran, said, “This is the kind of thing that gets people killed.” 

Use of the Signal app for discussions among government officials is also improper because the app can be set to delete messages sent over its system after a short waiting period. Thus, these messages are not preserved as is required by government records law. Indeed, evasion of records-preservation requirements is the only apparent reason why the chat participants used Signal rather than a more secure system. 

There is nothing to indicate that this was the only use of Signal by these individuals, raising concerns both for the possible hacking of other such conversations and for the preservation of records of those communications. No one on the chat raised a question about the use of Signal, and they all appeared to be comfortable using it.  

Another striking aspect of the chat is the shallowness of the policy discussion among the participants. No one appeared to know or care about the consequences of the attack or the relative effectiveness of alternative methods of protecting shipping in the Red Sea. The only policy discussions were about the appropriateness of using U.S. resources to protect shipping lanes more important to European shippers than to American ones, getting some compensation from the Europeans for America’s efforts, and the timing of the attacks.   

Thousands of public servants, both civilian and in military uniforms, handle classified or secret information every day. The vast majority of them meticulously maintain the highest precautions and care to protect this nation’s secrets. If they fail to do so, they face repercussions, up to and including the loss of their jobs. There have been numerous reports of punishment for even minor infractions, such as wearing a FitBit into a room that is supposed to be free of outgoing communications devices.  

While this federal workforce consistently brings the highest levels of professionalism and competence to their jobs, the members of the Signal group chat, including Vice President J.D. Vance; Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth; National Security Advisor Michael Waltz; Secretary of State Marco Rubio; Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard; and Director of Central Intelligence John Ratcilffe, all failed to demonstrate professionalism or competence when they conducted their group chat with a journalist on a chat system that was not secure enough to safely handle classified or sensitive information. 

Now, as evidenced in a public hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee on March 25, 2025, including questioning by Senator Mark Warner, the members of the group chat are trying to cover up and flatly deny the nature and extent of their violations. None of the participants have made any promise to be more careful in the future. 

Tell our elected representatives that everyone who participated in these breaches of security, and especially those most directly responsible – Peter Hegseth, Secretary of Defense; and Michael Waltz, National Security Advisor – should resign immediately or be fired.

Rep. Don Beyer   https://beyer.house.gov/contact/   (202) 225-4376

Sen. Mark Warner  https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/contact   202-224-2023

Sen. Tim Kaine   https://www.kaine.senate.gov/contact/share-your-opinion   202-224-4024